[tahoe-dev] switching from introducers to gossip?

erpo41 at gmail.com erpo41 at gmail.com
Thu Jul 12 00:54:02 UTC 2012


Could Bob choose his own node as the rendezvous point, totally eliminating
the load on the tor network?

On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 6:45 AM, Michael Rogers <michael at briarproject.org>wrote:

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> On 11/07/12 14:02, James A. Donald wrote:
> >> It seems people are only aware of the last feature because of
> >> the poorly chosen name.  IMO, the "hidden" aspect is one of the
> >> less interesting features.  I've heard a rumor that there's a
> >> proposal to make a version of this feature which provides the
> >> other features without the hidden part for the benefit of lower
> >> latency.
> >
> > This would be extremely convenient, for unhidden tor services could
> > not only provide lower latency, but could handle high bandwidth.
>
> I think it might be possible to handle this from the client side by
> building circuits with fewer than three hops.
>
> If I remember right, hidden services work something like this:
>
> * Alice, a client running a hidden service, chooses several
> introduction points and builds a circuit to each one
> * Alice anonymously publishes the addresses of the introduction points
> * Bob, a client wishing to contact Alice's hidden service, anonymously
> retrieves the addresses of the introduction points
> * Bob chooses a rendezvous point and builds a circuit to it
> * Bob builds a circuit to one of Alice's introduction points and
> informs Alice of the rendezvous point
> * If Alice accepts the connection, she builds a circuit to Bob's
> rendezvous point, which connects Alice's circuit to Bob's circuit
> * Alice and Bob communicate through the connected circuits
>
> Usually each circuit has three hops, but if Alice and Bob don't need
> to be anonymous or unlinkable they can use one-hop circuits. The final
> connection would have two hops: Alice <-> rendezvous point <-> Bob.
>
> The client is responsible for choosing the length of the circuit in
> Tor, so it should be possible to do this through a client library like
> Silvertunnel without modifying the protocol or the relays.
>
> Cheers,
> Michael
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